Kishanji Betrayed By Inner Circle

Caesar Mandal, TNN | Nov 26, 2011, 06.04AM IST

WEST MIDNAPORE: Why did Kishanji risk coming out of hiding when he knew that security forces were on the offensive in Bengal?

It appears that the Maoist politburo member was alarmed by the cracks in the ranks. The state rebel leadership had varying perceptions about the new government and of their own tactics. There was a growing disillusionment among second generation Maoist leaders. Besides, the federal functioning of the rebel organisation may have forced Kishanji's hand.

He had no choice but to get drawn into the quagmire of Jangalmahal. It was the last decision he ever took.

There was a growing lack of coordination between Bikash - known to be one of the closest to Kishanji - and Akash, who was not in the best of terms with the politburo member. Sashadhar Mahato's widow Suchitra, who got close to Kishanji after Sashadhar's death, also had her differences with Akash. The bitterness and confusion trickled down to the Maoist-led mass organisations and also their fringe connects in Kolkata. This was quite apparent from the text and tenor of the press releases issued from time to time.

Those following the developments can easily distinguish between the positive attitude of Akash towards the "peace process", and the combative ones issued by Baha Tudu. Though Akash repeatedly claimed that his view was approved by the CPI(Maoist) central committee, the zonal commanders and frontal leaders were eager to hear from Kishanji. In fact, Kishanji's silence to Mamata's peace offer was quite perplexing. If the Maoists had agreed to talks, why wasn't the media savvy Kishanji talking?

That's not all. The Maoist camp was divided on organisational tactics as well. For instance, senior CPI(Maoist) state committee members were not unanimous on the decision to kill intelligence branch inspector Partha Biswas and NGO activist Samarjit Basu, who were abducted from a Jangalmahal village.

A series of encounter killings and arrests had shaken up the Maoist ranks. Kishanji knew it would take his direct intervention. The cracks in the state leadership were already impeding the regrouping of Maoists in Bengal and their political expansion.

According to Maoist sources, Kishanji entered West Midnapore a fortnight ago to iron out the differences. He met front ranking Maoists in Bengal and was preparing to meet zonal commanders, such as Jayanta and Ranjan Munda, to explain to them the party strategy.

But little did Kishanji realise that the cellphone he once used to send across messages to the PLGA or his comrades to dodge police could also be used against him by members of his inner circle. This apprehension was growing within the Maoist ranks following Sasadhar Mahato's death in a police encounter. Leading Maoists had started to suspect moles within the ranks, who might be passing on vital information to security forces.

The fact that Maoists are not invincible is apparent from the series of surrenders, starting with Sobha Mandi and more recently the feared Jagori Baske. Even if they were removed from Maoist squads years ago, the police have already established contacts with some of the men within the squads. The renegades, who are yet to surrender, have been feeding police with specific information about Kishanji like they did when Sasadhar Mahato was in hiding. They have also ratted on Kishanji's core team and their way of functioning - vital clues to anyone trying to second guess his moves.

A section of the Maoists, however, has started suspecting the peace process itself. They argue that the Centre and state governments have earlier used this tactic to track high-profile Maoist leaders. They took lesson from Andhra Pradesh, where politburo member Azad was killed in an encounter while returning from peace negotiations with the Centre.

Kishanji's death also came at a time when the state government was in peace talks. Chief minister Mamata Banerjee has been earnest about bringing about peace in Jangalmahal and has repeatedly urged Maoists to surrender. She even refused to disband the state-appointed band of mediators when they offered to resign because of the continuing security operations.

But how could the security forces track Kishanji when he was nowhere in the peace initiative? Organisers close to the Maoists have started suspecting Akash. They maintain that the state appointed interlocutors got in touch with Akash who gave his views after consultations with Kishanji. This might have helped security forces track Kishanji's location. The forces also started cultivating moles within the Maoist squads and the local sources to zero in on the fugitive. The renegades in police contact might have then given additional inputs about Kishanji's defence and suggested ways to break the layers of his security.

Riddled body leaves unsolved mysteries

Caesar Mandal, TNN | Nov 26, 2011, 06.03AM IST

JHARGRAM: Was Maoist politburo member Kishanji moving alone in the Jhargram forests when he was shot dead on Thursday? Where did his comrade Suchitra Mahato disappear after sustaining injuries? Where were his bodyguards when he was being hounded by CoBRA jawans? And finally why did Kishanji emerge from hiding at a time when the joint forces were in assault mode? These questions remain unanswered a day after his death.

Officers who led the operation said they had accurate information that a group of at least 15 heavily armed rebels, including Kishanji and Suchitra, had taken refuge in Burishole forest late on Wednesday after security forces surrounded them in Kushboni forest of Binpur block of West Midnapore, 9km from Jhargram town.

"Initially, they camped at Nalboni, a village in Kushboni. When the forces reached the village, they moved west, crossed Kongsaboti irrigation canal and took refuge in Burishole," said a senior CRPF officer on Thursday night.

The forces were hot on their trail and soon cordoned off the entire forest. Slowly, they pushed the rebels south west, where the forest ends at Burishole village. "We managed to trap them and they had no way to go. Kishanji hid behind this four-foot high anthill," said a CRPF commandant on Friday morning, pointing the blood-soaked spot where Kishanji's bullet riddled body was found.

It is hardly 50 meters from the end of forest where the village starts. Blood smeared soil, cartridge casings, splinters of mortar shells and bullets embedded in the anthill indicate the severity of the encounter.

The question is why was Kishanji the only one killed when he always travelled with armed bodyguards? A police officer said three more rebels were possibly killed and some more injured but there was no trace of them. Even sniffer dogs were of no help.

Police suspect Suchitra fled through the fields adjoining Burishole village, but no villager confirms it. "An hour before sundown we heard heavy firing in the forest close to the village playground. Police surrounded the entire village. We did not see anyone escape. Two village youths who went to the field were arrested," said Laksmi Mahato, a local.

Police, however, stuck to their theory, saying they recovered a laides' handbag with Sashadhar's picture and news clippings. "We suspect it is Suchitra's bag. She might have left it while escaping," said Jhargram SDPO Sumit Kumar.

If this is true, were Kishanji and Suchitra alone in the forest? Where did the others go?

On Wednesday, police said they had broken the first cordon of Kishanji's four-ring security in Kushboni jungle. How did he become alone the very next day? There is no physical evidence of any of his bodyguards putting up a last stand to save him. How could they disappear so quickly despite being surrounded?

Of late Kishanji was not seeing eye to eye with Akash, sources say. All the key Maoist leaders in Jangalmahal were aware of his arrival and movements. Sources feel that vital information about Kishanji's movement might have been leaked by some insiders who have been maintaining tacit contact with police.

The police raid on Wednesday might have forced him to move alone or only with his trusted comrade Suchitra. He might have been wary of his own men. Getting separated from his security platoon perhaps made it easy for the forces to hunt him down.

Most interestingly, a day after the encounter, police recovered some mattresses close to the spot where Kishanji died. "It was an open space. We fail to understand why he would stay at such place, even for brief period," wondered a villager.

Maoist bid for Myanmar haven fails

Nirmalya Banerjee, TNN | Nov 19, 2011, 02.58AM IST

KOLKATA: A plan by CPI(Maoist) to use its connections with Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur to get sanctuary in Myanmar has come to naught because of reservations of the rebel leaders from the northeast, according to an Imphal-based defence source. PLA activists in Manipur have revealed this to security forces, he says.

According to the source, CPI(Maoist) leaders had requested PLA to arrange this shelter in the middle of the current year, soon after the Maoists started feeling the heat of stepped-up pressure of joint operations against Maoists in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand as well as West Bengal.

Leaders of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), the "guardians" of assorted rebel groups from northeast India sheltered in Myanmar, did not favour this idea, security forces have learnt.

NSCN (K) leaders have reasoned that the presence of Maoists in Myanmar would be revealed in no time because the features of CPI(Maoist) members would not match with that of members of northeastern rebel groups taking shelter there.

They fear that if the Indian authorities learn of the presence of Maoists in hideouts of northeastern rebels in Myanmar, they would put pressure on the authorities in Myanmar to launch an offensive against camps of NSCN(K) and other northeastern rebels there. Otherwise, the presence of NSCN(K) camps in Myanmar is not a big threat as NSCN(K) has signed a ceasefire agreement with the Centre.

A large NSCN(K) camp is located at Taga in Myanmar where members of a number of other rebel groups from the northeast, like United Liberation Front of Asom and PLA, have also taken shelter. NSCN(K) chairman S S Khaplang, being a Myanmarese Naga himself, wields more influence there than leaders of other rebel groups.

It may be recalled that two PLA leaders arrested in Delhi in October this year revealed to the police that CPI(Maoist) leaders were wanted to joint training camps with PLA in Myanmar. Earlier, in October 2008, leaders of CPI(Maoist) and of Revolutionary eoples Front, political wing of PLA, had signed an understanding for mutual co-operation and issued a joint declaration.

Militant groups of the northeast enjoy the advantage of crossing the international border easily and take shelter in foreign soil when they find the pressure of operations by security forces too much. Maoists operating in places far from any international border find it difficult to secure such sanctuaries. Links with rebel groups of the northeast would help Maoists to secure sanctuaries as well as arms and ammunition, say sources.

Hint of tribal alienation?

Saugata Roy, TNN | Nov 18, 2011, 07.00AM IST

KOLKATA: Those who had been to Jagori Baske's home in Purulia's Bagdubi village would be aware of the pitiable background of this shy adivasi girl who later turned into a brutal Maoist squad leader. A mud house behind a pond in this forest hamlet, no land to fall back upon and no cattle to rear. Jagori lived with her mother in extreme poverty, surviving on a meagre income from babui grass.

Jagori had the desperation and zeal to break out of the penury - the Maoists gifted her a dream that shattered midway.

What does her surrender signify? Are the Maoists losing their foothold in Jangalmahal? And if so, is the Trinamool Congress gaining new ground when the CPM organisers are on their heels? The series of developments that led to the dramatic surrender displays a lack of trust towards the Maoists. But this is not all. It has created a void among the adivasis that is more significant than the surrender. The innocent adivasis, who largely supported the 'bon parti' against the CPM's domination, are at a loss.

Those in power have failed to understand the socio-cultural fabric of the adivasi community which is as important as the under-development that plagues the region. It's true that Maoists have smashed the adivasi patriarchy that was the last word in the community. But the mainstream political parties - CPM and of late Trinamool - dominated by the Sarkars, Pandeys, Roys and Adhikarys have never spared a thought to engage the adivasi samaj that could work wonders in bringing peace to the area.

Jagori's surrender is not an isolated case, as Maoists would like to showcase it. Shobha Mandi, another tribal Maoist squad leader, was the first to surrender. Gurucharan Kisku alias Marshall was among the men dumped by Maoists, and later Laxmikanta Baske from Katasimul village joined the Trinamool-backed platform.

They are all adivasis - a major contingent of the Jangalmahal population that played a key role in the Lalgarh uprising in 2007. It sent ripples in the entire adivasi samaj. Sensing the mood, the Maoists kept tribals Lalmohan Tudu (killed) and Sukhshanti Baske (now in custody) in the first panel of the People's Committee Against Police Atrocities. Chhatradhar Mahato (a non-tribal) was the spokesperson. A little after the uprising, the Maoists took over completely and broke the writ of the adivasi society.

This seems to have triggered the alienation. The Maoist diktat also began to dominate personal relations within the guerrillas. It became evident when the party didn't allow Jagori to marry her mentor Gurucharan Kisku alias Marshall and instead made her tie the wedlock with Rajaram Soren. Marshall felt out with the Maoist leadership and was shown the door, so was Jagori. It did not go down well among the adivasis.

"I won't go into the internal affairs of the Maoists. But it's a fact that Maoists are losing public support among the adivasis. But there is no one to address their concerns. We are trying in our own little way," said CPI(M-L) leader Santosh Rana.

Jagori's surrender may prompt the Maoists to regroup themselves among the adivasis who are not taking them in right earnest. They might try to consolidate their position among the non-tribal Mahato community, which might further aggravate the social tension.

The Mamata Banerjee government cannot make much headway in the adivasi belt with its band of bureaucrats. The BPL rice that was promised to them has been stopped for over a week, soon after the government ordered a three-tier committee comprising BDOs, SDOs and district magistrate to revamp the delivery system.

Jagori's surrender: The backroom story

Caesar Mandal, TNN | Nov 19, 2011, 02.59AM IST

KOLKATA: Jagori Baske's dramatic surrender before chief minister Mamata Banerjee on Thursday has only added to the mystery that has surrounded the dreaded Maoist for most of her life.

When exactly did she surrender? Was it before the last assembly polls? Did Kolkata Police play a crucial role? How were Jagori and her husband, Maoist comrade Rajaram Soren, clad in crisp battle fatigues if they were on the run for months? And what is the role of renegade Maoist Gurucharan Kisku alias Marshall, Jagori's mentor?

These questions had the administrative circles abuzz all of Friday.

TOI has pieced together the chain of events that led to the most sensational surrender of a Maoist leader in Bengal.

It all started more than an year ago - July 2010, when the Left Front government announced its rehab offer for Maoists. For officers on the field, the instruction was clear - the government had heeded to their request for a surrender package and they had to show results. But getting a Maoist top gun to surrender was easier said than done.

Marshall was the first choice. A Dalma squad leader and one of the first Maoist recruits, he was named in the 2003 ambush of seven policemen in Bandwan but had been dumped by the rebels in 2007 for his reported "ideological deviation".

He was itching to get back at his former comrades after being shown the door. He first came in contact with the Jharkhand government-sponsored anti-Maoist forum and later with an IPS officer in West Midnapore (this officer is now with Kolkata Police).

Marshall was ready to work for police - and he did - but he was surprisingly reluctant to accept the surrender proposal.

Wily that he is, Marshall sensed that his steadfast refusal may trigger a bitter conflict with his police "handlers". Police, too, realised that they were the only ones protecting him from his former comrades, who were baying for his blood. Marshall then played his trump card. He assured his handlers of a prized catch - Jagori, the feared guerrilla he had groomed.

Jagori had been fiercely loyal to Marshall ever since she left her home in Purulia's Bakdoba village as a 16-year-old. Even in the Maoist fold, she had to pay a price for her devotion to her mentor even after he was expelled. Despite her "brilliance" in guerrilla tactics, her party didn't hesitate to throw her out for her continued relation with Marshall.

Deserted by her party and hounded by police, Jagori was in dire straits with her month-old infant when Marshall once again surfaced in her life offering help.

"Jagori never indulged in anti-party activities, ever, but she could never completely alienate herself from Marshall. It was a tough dilemma. We were contemplating taking her back in 2009," a senior Maoist leader had told TOI some time ago. This leader has been "missing" for the past year but if sources are to be believed, he is recuperating from a critical ailment in a police "safe house."

This isn't new to Bengal. It's said another elderly Maoist ideologue was cared for in a police safe house until he died of a chronic ailment.

Marshall, on his part, was well aware of the extent to which he could cash in on the Jagori bait. He held on to her in such a manner that it led to a delicate and protracted "negotiation" which continued for more than 11 months. Whether Jagori gave herself up to police or whether Marshall tipped police of her movements may always remain a mystery.

Incidentally, Jagori's comrade-in-arms Shova Mandi was intercepted by police in March 2010 on National Highway-6. She was then headed for Midnapore for treatment on a motorcycle with her husband Kamal Mahato. Mandi officially "surrendered" in August 2010.

Sources said that after initial counseling, Jagori reportedly stayed in a safe house on the outskirts of Kolkata, ringed by a police camp. She might have been debriefed by some Kolkata Police officers before being handed to the custody of the IB, say sources.

Maoists are usually very prompt in alerting the media should any of their cadres goes missing for a certain period. In Shova's case the rebels had issued one such statement long before her surrender. But in Jagori's case, there was no such statement. The dreaded rebel had been expelled and given up for good by her comrades.

Jagori's surrender may be the most dramatic yet, but it won't be the last. It wouldn't be surprising if in the next few days another Maoist couple - both of them feared squad members - also surrender. Negotiations are on to pull them in, say sources.

West Bengal: Re-inventing Folly

By Fakir Mohan Pradhan

Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

July 4, 2011

Parties in Opposition seeking election have repeatedly, in the past, entered into usually covert deals with insurgent groups in various theatres of conflict in India, and events in West Bengal appear to have followed this opportunistic line. The Trinamool Congress (TMC) which has come to power with a huge majority in the elections of April-May 2011, had engaged in a strident and disruptive campaign, sustained over more than two years, in close coordination with the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and its various front organizations, prominently including the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA). With the installation of Mamata Bannerjee’s TMC in Writer’s Building, it is now evidently payoff time for the Maoists.

In her first Press Conference as Chief Minister on May 21, 2011, when asked about withdrawal of Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) from the Jungle Mahal area of the State, Banerjee replied, “We will first cross check things. But I must tell you that we will never backtrack from our commitment.’’ In the run-up to the Assembly polls, Mamata had been vociferously demanding withdrawal of CPMFs deployed in anti-Maoist operations in Jungle Mahal (the Maoist-affected area comprising West Midnapore, Bankura and Purulia). Indeed, she had flatly denied the presence of the Maoists in the area, claiming, “there are no Maoists in Jungle Mahal, there are only Marxists who are ‘Marxists in the day and Maoists at night.’” Her Lalgarh rally on August 9, 2010, had visibly demonstrated the TMC’s proximity to the PCPA and the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist).

After the TMC’s landslide victory, things have started to unfold in a predictable way as far as anti-Maoist operations are concerned. There has been an evident ‘slow down’’ of the Security Forces’ (SFs) offensive against Maoists in the State since the election results were declared on May 13, 2011. On condition of anonymity, an unnamed senior officer of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) disclosed that intelligence inputs provided by the State Police had petered out after the change of Government and that, "for the past month, there has not been any major raid against Maoists as the local Police did not accompany the Central Force for one reason or the other." Every platoon of CPMFs is required to be accompanied by at least eight local Police personnel to familiarize them with the areas.

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has also expressed concern that the joint forces' operation in West Bengal has “slowed down”, and that CPMFs in Jungle Mahal have been "sitting idle" since Bannerjee’s installation as CM. "Right now the Central Forces are going on patrols for area familiarization," another unnamed official stated. Thirty-five companies of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), six companies of Nagaland Police and 51 companies of the State Police have been deployed in the Jungle Mahal region.  Sources indicate that top Police officers in Bengal fear that if they initiate operations against the Maoists, it could anger Mamata Banerjee. Kolkata Police's Special Task Force (STF) is also said to have been asked to go slow against Maoists and take prior approval before going for any action.

The fatalities data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal give a clear demonstration of the trends.

Fatalities in Left-wing Extremist Violence in West Bengal: 2009-2011

Years           Civilian           SF personnel  Maoist insurgents      Total

2009             134                           15                 9                             158

2010              328                          36              61                             425

2011*               33                            1                 4                             38

* Data till July 3, 2011 Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal

Monthly Fatalities in Left-wing Extremist Violence in West Bengal in 2011

                  Civilian     SFs      Insurgents      Total

January          18          0              1                    19

February         7            0            0                     7

March             2             1             3                     6

April                4             0            0                     4

May                 1             0            0                     1

June                 1             0            0                    1

July*                 0            0            0                   0

Total               33             1           4                   38

* Data till July 3, 2011 Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal

There has been just one fatality in the State since Banerjee took over, and total fatalities this year are down to 38, as against the two years of violent mobilization preceding, which saw 425 killed in 2010 and 158 in 2009.

Though the Government has not given any formal order to the SFs regarding anti-Maoist operation, the Police leadership is taking its cue from certain obvious decisions. West Midnapore District had two Superintendent of Police (SP) ranked officers, but the new Government has reduced this to just one SP rank officer. Similarly, since June 2009, to intensify the anti-Maoist operation and for a better coordination with CPMFs, a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) ranked officer was assigned to head each Maoist-hit Police Station of the District. Over the past weeks the DSPs, who were on deputation, were called back to their original postings. Anti-Maoist operations have, on all practical accounts, been entirely suspended.

Significantly, though the SFs were facing an uphill task before the polls, the CPMFs had achieved some success, including the killing of Sasadhara Mahato, the prime accused of Salboni landmine attack, on March 10, 2011. The domination of Maoists in the Jungle Mahal area had diminished. One SF source explained, “Earlier there used to be a looming danger of being ambushed. Now we are trying to engage with the villagers and build trust…” Another officer stated, “While a part of it (Jungle Mahal) was cleared by our security forces, the rest had been cleared with the help of the CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] supporters.”

Confirming the suspension of operations and the implicit ‘deal’ with the Government, the Maoists have also declared a ‘ceasefire’ in West Bengal in order to give Mamata Banerjee “time to fulfil her promises to Jungle Mahal”, including the withdrawal of Joint Forces. Bikram, a CPI-Maoist ‘State committee’ member, issued a statement on June 4, 2011, declaring: “We want her (Mamata) to fulfil all the promises she had made in last year’s Lalgarh rally. We will not place any fresh demands to the Chief Minister for now… We are even ready for talks with the State Government.” The Maoists have also announced that they would not launch any attacks on the SF’s in the State, for the time being. Without specifying how long they planned to continue with the ‘ceasefire’, the statement, however, qualified that the “soft” stance will not be maintained for an indefinite period.

Maoist sources, however, clarified that they “would not stop killing corrupt CPI-M leaders and cadres” because of the cease-fire. A rebel source thus stated, “The cease-fire does not mean that we will not wipe out the CPM’s corrupt leaders and cadres in our stronghold. Our operation to drive out the CPM from Jungle Mahal will continue. CPM leaders, including Sushanta Ghosh, Dipak Sarkar, Anuj Pandey and Dahareshwar Sen, will have to face punishment. We want Mamata to start criminal cases against them.”

Earlier, on May 18, 2011, the Maoist-backed PCPA had also expressed its willingness to enter into a dialogue process with the Banerjee Government. However, PCPA chief Manoj Mahato was arrested on July 1 on the charge of abduction of Jiten Mahato, a Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) leader, who had been abducted in September 2009.

However, while the Maoists are clearly seeking their pound of flesh from the Government for the support extended to the TMC in the extended run-up to the polls, signs of a souring of relations are already visible. Maoist-backed PCPA cadres are threatening TMC workers, demanding that they quit the party and join PCPA, in a bid to exert pressure on the Mamata Banerjee-led Government to expedite the release of ‘political prisoners’ (Maoist cadres and leaders), and push for withdrawal of Central Forces from Jungle Mahal. Local TMC activists claimed they had been threatened in at least 20 villages of Jhargram, Salboni, Sankrail and Kotwali areas of West Midnapore: “Maoist armed squad leader Badal Mahato travels with his guerrillas at night and holds meetings. He tells villagers about Mamata Banerjee’s promises. He says if the promises are not kept, they will wipe out TMC from Jungle Mahal,” an unnamed TMC activist claimed. A Dherua-based TMC leader disclosed that, on June 2, 2011, a local PCPA leader had visited him at night and asked him to quit TMC and join the PCPA: “He [the local PCPA leader] told me that they had helped us to defeat the CPM. Now that CPM has lost, we will not allow any other political party to function in the area. He also told me that whatever must be done will be done through the PCPA… After the Assembly poll results, local PCPA leaders changed their attitude. They said they fought the CPM because it was the ruling party. Because the situation has changed and TMC shares power both in Bengal and at the Centre, they now say their fight is against us. If you want to live, then quit TMC, one of them told me.” District TMC Chairperson Mrigen Maity conceded: “We have received reports from our workers in Jhargram, Salboni, Sankrail and Kotwali areas that they are being threatened by Maoists and the PCPA. We will soon submit a report to the State TMC leadership.”

These allegations have, however, been denied by PCPA leader Manoj Mahato, who claimed that it was the villagers in Jungle Mahal who were demanding that TMC deliver on its promises: “PCPA leaders are not threatening TMC workers… Now that TMC has been voted to power, it is quite natural that villagers will ask party workers about the promises.”

With the SFs sitting idle, moreover, there is mounting evidence that the Maoists have started regrouping and extending recruitment. CRPF Inspector General T. B. Rao notes, “Top Maoist leaders Akash and Bikash are now moving around in Garbeta." Maoist insiders hinted that they were trying to expand their political activities for further recruitment and to recover the initial setbacks they had suffered during the SF operation in the pre-election phase. There is no immediate intent to intensify ‘military operations’, and the Maoist focus will currently remain on recruitment and reorganization.

Meanwhile, Banerjee claims that, under her regime, the Maoists would be ‘wiped out’ from the State as she would ‘bring development’ to the people: “We will bring development in the State and end Naxalism,” she declared on May 14, 2011. During an interactive session with industrialists aimed to woo investors to Jungle Mahal, on May 18, she added, “There is a law and order problem [in Jungle Mahal] but the people there are good. Do not be scared and try to give it a shot.”

Such delusional ignorance of the clear facts of history, of the long trajectory of Maoist operations across the country, and of Maoist ideology, strategy and tactics, can only bring disaster to the West Bengal. Bannerjee may believe that she is starting out anew, but her fantasies of ‘developing’ her way out of the Maoist challenge have a long and sorry chain of precedents. Several State Governments in the past have, moreover, entered into similar deals with the devil, and it is the SFs and the people who have had to pay the price in blood, for political opportunism and folly.

SOURCE:http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair9/9_52.htm#assessment2

Maoists reorganising in Bengal

Caesar Mandal, TNN

Jun 17, 2011, 06.44pm IST

KOLKATA: Maoist once again in a reorganisation bid in West Bengal following the formation of new government. Weeks ago, Maoist leader Bikash and Bikram on behalf of outfit's west Bengal state committee announced that the outfit is ready for talks with Mamata Banerjee led Bengal government if the state create a conducive atmosphere for talks.

Sources said, responding the Maoist feeler, state government has already slowed down the pace of anti-Maoist operation in Jangalmahal for past few weeks. Even in the formation of policing the state has brought some visible change which indicate that government is want to send a positive message to the red rebels.

Earlier in West Midnapore district, where Lalgarh is situated on of the most Maoist hit district in Bengal had two SP ranked officers to curb down Maoist 'menace'. But the new government has changed it and now only one SP rank officer is managing the entire district. Similarly since June 2009, to intensify the Maoist operation and for a better coordination with central forces a deputy Superintendent ranked officer was assigned to head each Maoist hit police stations of the district. In past few weeks DSP's who were on deputation were called back to their original posting.

" Practically anti-Maoist operation has been suspended,' said a police officer. CRPF officers posted in the trouble zone have also corroborated the fact.

Taking advantage of the situation, several senior Maoist leaders reportedly came down to the forested plains of Lalgarh and adjoining area. " Even once again, one of their central committee member is active in an around Jhargram area along with ther state leadership like Akash and Bikash,' said an intelligence officer who pointed out the Thursday incident in Jahrgram. On Thursday afternoon, a mob of Peoples Committee Against Police Atrocities(PCPA) beleived to be the mass outfit of the Maoists ransacked houses of five CPM leaders at Sapdhara and Aguiboni village of Jhargram. " It is significant because since police operation was started, PCPA never tried to do such daring attack in broad day light. Such happened when the entire area was under Maoist seize for eight months since november 2008," said an intelligence officer, who confirmed that some armed Maoist cadres had led the mob on Thursday.

Maoist insiders however hinted that they are now trying to expand their political activities for further recruitment and to recover the initial set back during recent police operation. Maoist are not in a mood to intensify their military operation rather they are trying to reorganise.